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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
without notice of such provision, purchases the goods .. .before the
contract or copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless
such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the making of
the conditional sale. This section shall not apply to conditional sales
of goods for resale.
And as to conditional sales of goods for resale, Section 69 states:
the reservation of property shall be void against purchasers ...for
value in the ordinary course of business ... even though the contract
or a copy thereof shall be filed....
From the language of the statute, the argument made by C.I.T. runs as
follows:
1. Section 65 does not apply when the goods in question are sold
conditionally for resale. Since Lazzaro is to be considered a
conditional buyer for the purposes of this determination, and since
the cars were conditionally sold for resale, the protection of Section
65 is not available to Rand.
2. Section 69 applies only to purchasers in the ordinary course of
business. Rand, a chattel mortgagee, cannot therefore avail itself
of this section.
3. Even though the conditional sales contracts were unrecorded, as
between Rand and C.I.T., the latter's title is superior.
The Court, in deciding for Rand, followed this line of reasoning:
1. Section 65's limitation is not designed to deprive that section of its
efficacy. Its purpose is to segregate a special class of purchasers
and, by the mechanics of Section 69, give them superior protection
(their rights are preserved even when the conditional sales contract
is recorded).
2. ". . . [S]ection 65's exclusion of 'sales of goods for resale' is
designed to provide anyone who comes within its compass with the
greater protections of Section 69, but it is not
designed to provide
22
less protection than section 65 itself does."
3. Since that is the purpose of the limitation, Rand's right to the cars
is established under Section 65, because C.I.T. failed to record the
contract.
It would seem that student applause is superfluous in the face of such a
logical and salutary result.
E.H.
CRIMINAL LAW
CREATION OF A FICTIONAL CITIZEN'S ARREST

Police officers and private citizens may make an arrest without a warrant in
the instance of a misdemeanor which is committed or attempted in their
22. Rand's Discount Co. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., supra note 16 at 459,
214 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
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presence.' In the case of a citizen's arrest, the person arrested must be delivered
2
to a magistrate or police officer immediately.
In People v. Foster,3 the defendant, a sixteen-year-old Negro girl,
appealed from a conviction of third degree assault committed on the person of
a police officer as the result of her efforts to resist arrest. The defendant argued
that her alleged assault on the police officer was in reality an effort to resist an
illegal arrest, for it is settled law that a person has a right to resist an illegal
arrest, provided that he use no more force than is necessary. 4 The defendant
contended that her arrest was illegal because it was made without a warrant
for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the police officer. The
particular question presented to the Court of Appeals in the present case was
whether defendant's arrest was legal.
As the defendant and two girl friends were walking past Mrs. Salzberg's
store, the first girl friend struck Mrs. Salzberg's daughter. Mrs. Salzberg rushed
to the aid of her daughter by hitting the second girl friend over the head with a
stool. The defendant then hit Mrs. Salzberg, who thereupon locked herself in
the store and called the police. When the police arrived, they found the
defendant kicking and screaming at the locked door. At the request of Mrs.
Salzberg, the police arrested the defendant at which time the defendant resisted
arrest and committed the assault on the police officer.
The Court of Appeals held that the arrest was legal and affirmed
defendant's conviction of third degree assault on the police officer. The Court
based its decision on two alternative grounds. The first ground was that the
assault on Mrs. Salzberg was in fact a continuing assault, the last phases of
which were perceived by the officer when he found the defendant kicking at
the door. Therefore, the misdemeanor was committed in the officer's presence
and the arrest was legal. The second ground for the decision was that Mrs.
Salzberg had arrested the defendant for the assault committed in her presence
and had delivered the defendant to the police officer. The arrest was, therefore,
a legal arrest by a citizen.
The opinion contains a strong dissent by Judge Froessel in which he
indicates that the facts demand a decision contrary to that reached by the
majority, since the misdemeanor, the assault on Mrs. Salzberg, was not in fact
committed in the officer's presence; there was a hiatus of time between the
assault and the arrest; the presence of a locked door between the defendant
and Mrs. Salzberg would negate any inference of a last phase to the assault at
the time of the arrival of the police. The dissent also challenges the citizen's
arrest theory on the grounds that there was no "actual restraint of the person
of the defendant" by Mrs. Salzberg, as required by Section 171 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
1. N.Y. Code Grim. Proc. §§ 177, 183.
2. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 185.
3. 10 N.Y.2d 99, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961).
4. People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
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The majority of the Court may be setting a new trend in its novel approach
to the mechanics of effecting a citizen's arrest. The language of the statute
seems to be explicit: "an arrest is made by the actual restraint of the person of
the defendant or by his submission to the custody of the officer," 5 and cases
uphold as valid a citizen's arrest in which the citizen physically subdues the
wrongdoer. 6 However, a lower court case, People v. Stewart,7 presents the
theory, similar to that advanced in the present case, of constructive arrest in
which physical restraint by the citizen making the arrest is not necessary. In
People v. Stewart, a policeman, called to investigate a family brawl, arrested
the husband for assaulting his wife. Although the arrest was legal on other
grounds, the court said in dictum that a valid citizen's arrest could have been
effected by the wife for the assault committed upon her before the arrival of
the policeman by her demanding the arrest of her husband when the policeman
did arrive. It is difficult to see how either the wife in People v. Stewart or
Mrs. Salzberg in the present case were physically capable of restraining her
assailant to perfect a technical arrest. By creating a fictional citizen's arrest,
the court is sanctioning an arrest made by a police officer upon the mere unsworn
complaint of the injury party.
0
The Court (majority) seems to be stretching the law to reach a desirable
result. Many victims have an understandable and often justifiable fear of
retaliation if they swear out a warrant against their assailant. The result is
that many grievances go unalleviated. Also there are many instances in which
the assailant, immune from arrest because the police officer was not present
when the misdemeanor was committed, departs, and since he is unknown to
those present, a warrant may not be obtained. Although the decision more
adequately meets present day law enforcement needs, there is a possibility that
the Court is usurping a legislative function in changing the existing laws as
to arrest for a misdemeanor.
P. A. L.
SINGLE OCCURRENCE SATISFIES COMMON GAMBLING AND BOOKMAKING RE-

QUIREMENTS
Is one transaction or a single occasion sufficient to satisfy a requirement of
"professionalism" under the New York bookmaking and common gambling
statutes? The Court of Appeals in two recent decisions, People ex rel. Guido v.
Calkins8 and People v. Pavia,9 regarded a single occasion sufficient to warrant
convictions.
In the Guido case, relator was convicted in the Schenectady Police Court
of aiding and abetting in the operation of a particular gambling establishment.
S. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 171.
6. See Bellinger v. State, 206 Misc. 575, 134 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ct. Cl. 1954); People v.
Ostrosky, 95 Misc. 104, 160 N.Y. Supp. 493 (County Ct. 1916).
7. 183 Misc. 212, 47 N.Y.S.2d 349 (City Ct. 1944).
8. 9 N.Y.2d 77, 211 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1961).
9. 8 N.Y.2d 333, 207 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1960).

